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Are We a Nation of Tax Cheaters? New Econometric
Evidence on Tax Compliance
By JEFFREY A. DUBIN, MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, AND Louis L. WILDE*

In 1982, then Commissioner of Internal
Revenue Roscoe Egger reported to Congress
that legal sector noncompliance with the
Federal Income Tax statutes generated an
"income tax gap" of $81 billion in 1981, up
from $29 billion in 1973. He further projected a gap of $120 billion for 1985 (U.S.
Congress, 1982). Perceptions of accelerating
noncompliance inspired a crisis mentality
within the Internal Revenue Service, Congress, and the tax bar.
The IRS responded in part by funding a
major independent study of tax noncompliance via the National Academy of Sciences,
and the American Bar Foundation initiated
an investigation of its own in 1984. Congress
enacted compliance legislation in 1981, 1982,
and 1984, and completely overhauled the
federal income tax laws in 1986. These enactments added a wide variety of new penalties for noncompliance and strengthened
others, dramatically expanded requirements

for 1985-to $92 billion; in fact, the real
income tax gap for individual returns is now
thought to have fallen from $39.1 billion in
1981 to $36.8 billion in 1986, measured in
1972 dollars. These figures do not support
the widespread claims that the American
public is becoming a nation of tax cheaters,
or that the integrity of the tax system is
seriously at risk, but the complete story is
much more complex. Not only must there be
additional efforts to determine what circumstances imply increased noncompliance, but
the effects of recent tax law and penalty

changes as well as changes in IRS budgets
and audit capacity must also be taken into
account. Ultimately this is an empirical story,
but valid empirical work must be based on
the proper theoretical foundation.
The theoretical basis for the economic approach to tax compliance has, at least until
recently, been inadequate, and the limited
empirical work based on it is seriously flawed.
In this paper we briefly review both, as well
as new theoretical and, especially, empirical
work on the tax compliance problem.

for third-party reporting of information to
the IRS, added to the IRS's arsenal of procedural weapons, and adopted everyone's favorite vehicle to combat noncompliancelower tax rates.
All this clamor and action has taken place
in the absence of any solid factual foundation (Graetz and Wilde, 1985). We are not at
all certain of the actual decline in tax compliance during the past decade, and even if
noncompliance has increased significantly,
its causes, and thus appropriate remedies,
simply are not known. For example, recent
unpublished IRS estimates have significantly
reduced Commissioner Egger's projections

I. The Economic Theory of Tax Compliance

The contemporary revival of the economic
analysis of crime began with Gary Becker's
classic 1968 article. While Becker mentioned
tax evasion as a potential application of his
general model, Michael Allingham and
Agnar Sandmo (1972) published the first
formal analysis. In their model, the taxpayer's actual income is exogenously given
and known only to the taxpayer. A constant
proportional tax is applied to reported income, with such reported amounts chosen by
*Assistant Professor of Economics, California In-the taxpayer to maximize expected utility of
stitute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125; Professor
net wealth. With some exogenous and conof Law, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520; and
stant probability, the taxpayer is "audited."
Professor of Economics, California Institute of TechIf the taxpayer is discovered to be underrenology, respectively.
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(1983), Ann Witte and Diane Woodbury
porting income, a penalty proportional to
(1984, 1985), Joel Slemrod (1985), and Dubin
the amount of undeclared income must be
and Wilde (1986).
paid in addition to the proportional tax rate.
The bulk of the remainder of the theoretiClotfelter analyzed a data set collected
cal economics literature on tax compliance
originally as part of the 1969 IRS Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP).
consists largely of extensions and refineThe TCMP involves detailed "line-by-line
ments of Allingham and Sandmo's model.
While many ambiguous results are produced
audits" of a stratified random sample of
taxpayers, which result in income tax assessby these analyses, one prediction is universal: an exogenous increase in the probability
ments regarded by the IRS as "correct." The
IRS uses TCMP audits in developing a scorof detection and conviction or in the penalty
rate will increase compliance.
ing mechanism (the "Discriminant Index
Function," or "DIF") to establish and refine
More recent theoretical innovations have
attempted to move out of the decision-theothe audit selection decisions it applies to the
larger population of taxpayers. The TCMP is
retic framework characteristic of the early
a far better technique for learning about the
tax compliance literature. Of particular ineffectiveness of IRS audits than about agterest here are the principal-agent models of
gregate noncompliance (Graetz and Wilde),
Kim Border and Joel Sobel (1987) and Jenbut it is nevertheless one of the best sources
nifer Reinganum and Wilde (1985) and the
of data currently available for estimating
game-theoretic model of Graetz et al. (1986).
noncompliance.
In both of these approaches the IRS is alUsing raw TCMP data, Clotfelter investilowed to act strategically, conditioning its
audit rules on the information it receives
gated the relationship between marginal tax
rates and tax evasion for three classes of
from taxpayers.
taxpayers (nonbusiness, nonfarm business,
Whether the IRS should be included as a
and farm). For each group, he regressed the
strategic actor in theoretical models of tax
compliance is of more than technical interlog of underreported income on a measure
of the effective marginal tax rate, after-tax
est. In assessing empirically the deterrent
effects of audits, it is crucial whether the IRSincome, wages as a proportion of adjusted
gross income, interest, and dividends as a
audit selection process turns on taxpayer
proportion of adjusted gross income, and
compliance behavior. If it does, then any
several socio-demographic variables. The
empirical model meant to explain taxpayer
average audit rate for each taxpayer class
compliance behavior that treats audit rates
was not included as an independent variable
as exogenous may be seriously misspecified.
In fact, any deterrent effect of audits may be since, as Clotfelter put it, "the probability
[of audit] for any tax return in a given class
outweighed by a (presumed) countervailing
is a function of its reported items" (p. 336);
incentive of the IRS to audit most heavily
those returns for which expected compliance
in other words, there is a potential simultais the lowest (in light of information reneity problem that makes it inappropriate to
ceived) and thereby produce an observed
use audit rates as exogenous explanatory
negative relationship between audits and
variables in an equation meant to explain
compliance.
compliance with the tax laws.
Clotfelter found that both the level of
II. Existing Empirical Work
after-tax income and marginal tax rates have
significant negative effects on compliance.
To date, there has been a surprisingly
While these results are interesting, they
small amount of empirical work on the deshould be used with caution. Clotfelter tried
terminants of tax compliance. Not counting
to avoid the simultaneity issue by leaving
survey work or work attempting to measure
audit rates out of his model, but his model is
aggregate noncompliance, we have found
still misspecified if audit rates affect complionly four relevant studies; Charles Clotfelter
ance. In any event, since he left audit rates
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out of his analysis, Clotfelter's work implies
nothing about their deterrent effects.

Witte and Woodbury (1985) explicitly attempt to analyze the effects of audit rates

and sanction levels on compliance using a
data set provided to them by the IRS. This
data includes a percentage compliance vari-

able related to 1969 returns filed in 1970
(estimated by the IRS from DIF scores, not
actual IRS audits), IRS agency variables such
as audit rates and sanction levels, and a host
of demographic and socioeconomic vari-

ables, all aggregated to the three-digit zip
code level. Separate equations were estimated for each of seven audit classes, defined by income level (low, medium, or high)

and by type of return (1040 only, Schedule C
or F present, Schedule C and F not present),
using seemingly unrelated regression. In
particular, the estimated 1969 percentage
compliance variable was regressed on a constant term and 36 explanatory variables, including audit rates for 1967, 1968, and 1969
within the audit class, and for all other audit
classes.

A detailed discussion of Witte and Woodbury's work can be found in Dubin and
Wilde. Two major problems with it are the
numerical properties of their data set are
unsatisfactory, and many of the agency variables are likely to be endogenous so that
their model is misspecified.
These problems perhaps explain some of
the peculiar results obtained by Witte and
Woodbury. In their 1985 paper, for example,
they report selected results for 3 of the 7
audit classes. For these audit classes, reported mean elasticities of percentage compliance with respect to "audit rates" range
from .002 to .02, approximately. However,
by referring to their 1984 working paper, one
finds first that these elasticities are obtained
by summing the coefficients, when significant, on all 6 of the audit variables (1967,
1968, and 1969 audit rates within each audit
class and for all other audit classes). Second,
only one of the 1969 within-class audit rate
variables is significant and it has a negative
sign, 6 of the 7 1968 within-class audit rate
variables are significant and half have a
negative sign, and 6 of the 7 1967 within-class
audit rate variables are significant, but all
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have a positive sign. It is difficult indeed to
conclude from these results that increases in
audit rates increase compliance.
Slemrod takes a different approach in his
analysis of tax avoidance. He notes that tax
liability is a step function of taxable income

for most taxpayers, the step-size being $50 in
1977. He shows that noncompliers, theoretically, have an incentive to report income
levels near the upper end of the relevant step
range. Using 1977 TCMP data, Slemrod regresses the taxpayer's position within the
relevant $50 bracket (a number from 1 to 50)
on several factors. A tendency to be located
higher in the relevant $50 bracket is shown
to be positively associated with higher
marginal tax rates, being less than 65-yearsold, being married, and the presence of certain "fungible items." But Slemrod's approach is of limited value at best; it cannot
get at the degree of tax evasion even if it is
present, as he hypothesizes.
The most recent empirical study of tax
noncompliance using microeconomic data is
by Dubin and Wilde. They analyze a subset
of the 1969 data set used by Witte and
Woodbury, augmented with data taken from
the 1969 Annual Report of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. The dependent variable
is the same as that used by Witte and Woodbury, an IRS estimate (based on DIF scores)
of the percentage compliance rates for individuals in each of the 7 audit classes described above.
The explanatory variables are the 1969

within-class audit rate; 3 variables that have
been thought to reflect opportunities to
evade: the unemployment rate, the percentage employed in manufacturing, and the
present self-employed; and 3 variables that
the literature (principally surveys) suggests
are important: the percentage of the population over 65-years-old, the percentage of persons over 25 with at least four years of high
school education, and the percentage of nonwhite population. Following recent theoretical work (and empirical work elsewhere in
the economics of crime literature), Dubin
and Wilde treat the audit rate as being
potentially endogenous. This hypothesis is
tested using an instrumental variables procedure, the "instruments" being the number of
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criminal fraud investigations initiated in 1970
per 1968 return filed in 1969, the percentage
of taxpayers receiving a first or second notice
in 1969 indicating that taxes were due, and

the IRS budget per tax return filed. Dubin
and Wilde regard the last of these as a good
instrument but discuss possible shortcomings of the first two.
In 4 of the 7 audit classes (low-income
nonbusiness with a standard deduction,
low-income business, and both high-income

classes), the audit rate was found to be endogenous. In all audit classes a deterrent
effect of audits on noncompliance was found,
but in 3 of the 4 cases in which audits were
found to be endogenous, the deterrent effect
was dominated by the countervailing incentives for the IRS to audit most heavily those
returns with the greatest expected noncompliance, so that, in equilibrium, audit rates
were negatively related to compliance for
these audit classes.
III. New Empirical Work

The Annual Report of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue contains a wealth of data
that has not to our knowledge been exploited by researchers. The typical report
gives state-level information for each type of
tax (individual and corporate income, estate
and gift, etc.) regarding total collections,
number and amount of refunds, number of
returns filed, number of returns examined,
additional tax and penalties recommended
after examination, and costs incurred by the
IRS. We have assembled data from these
Annual Reports for 1977 through 1985, and
we expect eventually to add additional years.
We have also obtained for these years data
on socioeconomic and demographic variables similar to those used by Dubin and
Wilde.
We have just begun to explore this rich
data set, but are able to report here three
preliminary results. Following Dubin and
Wilde, we use the percentage return per audit
for individual returns (additional tax and
penalties from audits total collections, per
million audits, in 1972 dollars) (PBANG) as
the dependent variable. Our independent
variables are lagged values of the audit rate

TABLE 1-COMPLIANCE, COLLECTIONS,
AND AUDIT EQUATIONS, 1978-85

Independent Dependent Variable
Variablea PBANG ICRC IAR(- 1)

ONE -12.945 -5.142 10.765
(1.00) (-4.688) (-3.809) (3.595)
IA R(-1) -0.008 0.003 -

(1.65) (-1.449) (1.000)
PIARb 0.881 0.181
(1.741) (5.403) (2.274)

-

PERED (-1) 3.607 -0.167 -0.813
(0.68) (4.224) (- 0.401) (- 0.972)

PEROLD(- 1) -0.940 1.675 -2.293

(0.42) (-0.659) (2.401) (-1.759)

UR (-1) -6.148 2.811 0.908
(0.073) (- 2.645) (2.473) (0.417)

PICA P (-1)C -1.162 1.548 0.009
(5.33) (- 5.367) (14.614) (0.458)
PICA P2( -1) 0.006 -0.007 -0.001

(29.73) (4.431) (- 10.963) (- 0.733)
PMAN(-1) -1.145 3.049 -1.460
(0.19) (- 1.409) (7.672) (- 2.154)
TIME 0.187 -0.001 -0.008
(81.5) (6.301) (-0.367) (- 2.961)
BPR(- 1)C - _ 289.965

(0.00042)

(6.745)

PIRF(-1) - - -3.267
(0.587)
(-2.927)
Number of

Observations 400 400 400
R-squared 0.298 0.632 0.247
Mean of

Dependent Var. 0.684 2.234 1.741
aMean values are shown in parentheses below variable names; t-statistics (below coefficients) while qualitatively similar to instrumental variable estimates, are
not identical.
bPIA R is the predicted value of IA R (-1) from the
audit equation.
cMeasured in thousands of 1972 dollars.

(examinations per 100 returns filed) (IAR);
percent of the adult population with a high
school education (PERED); percent of the
population over 45 (PEROLD); per capita
income (PICAP) and its square (PICAP2);
the unemployment rate (UR); percent of
the work force employed in manufacturing
(PMAN); and a time trend (TIME). We
allow for endogeneity of the audit rate using
the budget per return (BPR) and the percent
of individual returns filed (PIRF) as instruments. The time-series results are broadly
consistent with Dubin and Wilde's cross-section results: 1) the audit rate is endogenous
as indicated by the significant coefficient of
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the predicted audit rate (PIAR) in the compliance equation (Table 1, col. 2); 2) there is
a deterrent effect associated with increases in
the audit rate, but in equilibrium it is
dominated by the IRS's incentive to audit
according to expected yield; and 3) compliance increases with per capita income, but at
a decreasing rate, peaking below the maximum per capita income. In addition, there is
a significant negative time trend in the audit
rate and in compliance (see Table 1, cols. 2
and 4).

This last result appears quite significant;
after allowing for a variety of economic and
demographic factors and changes over time
in the state-level IRS budget per return filed,
we still find a significant negative time trend
both in the audit rate and in compliance. In
an effort to assess the impact of these negative trends on the overall performance of the
tax system, we also analyzed the time structure of individual collections per return filed.
Since one finds a deterrent effect of audits
in both the 1969 cross-section data set and
in the 1977-85 time-series, cross-section data

collections per return independent of actual
audits.
Further investigation of the time-series

data set should help sort out these issues.
But already we have leamed a great deal.
For example, the recent IRS estimates now
show the real compliance gap for individuals
to have increased from $22 billion in 1978 to
$36.8 billion in 1985, a difference of $14.85
billion. If, however, the audit rate had not
fallen during this period, our individual-collections-per-return equation indicates that
real individual collections would have risen
by $15.17 billion in 1985, actually lowering
the estimated tax gap in comparison to 1978.
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